



SWAT OPERATION







MAJOR ALI IQBAL



- Commissioned in October 1994 in an Armor Regiment
- Instructor in Armor School and Military Academy
- UN Mil Obsr – Sierra Leone
- Brigade Ops Officer Armor and Infantry Brigade
- Staff Course in 2005 (Quetta, Pak)
- Masters degree in Art and Science of Warfare
- Attending CGSC since June 2009

AIM

To present an overview of Operation Rah-e-Haq (The Right Path) in Swat with a view to draw pertinent lessons



SEQUENCE


- Genesis of Swat Crises
- Operation Rah-e-Haq Ph-I
- Operation Rah-e-Haq Ph-II
- Situation Analysis cum Lessons
- Current Situation

GEO/ DEMOGRAPHY - SWAT






Geography




N.W.F.P & FATA

CO-RELATION OF MALAKAND DIV




MALAKAND DIVISION NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE



DISTRICT SWAT

- Area 2374 Sq Mi
- Tehsils - 2
- UCs - 65



MAJOR TRIBES



➤ **YOUSAFZAIS**
➤ **KOHISTANIS**

40%
20%

GUJARS
SYEDS

30%
10%



POPULATION - 1.642 Mn
LITERACY RATE - 38.75 %

GENESIS OF SWAT CRISES



GENESIS OF SWAT CRISES

- Declared as a State by the Britishers in 1915, Swat along with states of Dir and Chitral merged with Pakistan in 1969



GENESIS OF SWAT CRISES

- Era of Wali-e-Swat (Local Ruler), till 1969, was known for prosperity and speedy justice. However, after the merger of Swat into Pakistan, slow and sluggish judicial system of Pakistan could not satisfy people of Swat
- Till 1973 judicial system of Swat was based on FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulation) like FATA

GENESIS OF SWAT CRISES

- In 1974 FCR was abolished and replaced by regular law which was considered no match to the judicial system of Wali-e-Swat by the people
- Resultantly, people thought that speedy justice would only be possible if Shariah (Islamic Law) is imposed in Swat

GENESIS OF SWAT CRISES

- The need for improved Judicial system was thus sloganized as demand of Nizam-e-Shariah by TNSM (Sufi Muhammad) which gradually gained public support and turned violent in 1994
- Consequently, an Operation was launched in 1994 by FC (Frontier Corps). Provincial Govt announced Nifaz-e-Shariah Regulation and situation was stabilized

GENESIS OF SWAT CRISES

- In 1999 Nifaz-e-Shariah Regulation was improved and enforced as Sharai Nizam-e-Adal Regulation to relate and restrict the issue of Shariah to Judicial system only
- People, however, continued to find faults in Sharai Nizam-e-Adl Regulation and the issue kept on lingering

GENESIS OF SWAT CRISES

- After 9/11 Sufi Muhammad mobilized people from Dir and took a Lashkar to Afghanistan and was arrested on return. TNSM was proscribed in 2002
- Gradually Sufi Muhammad was replaced by his Son-in-Law, Maulana Fazalullah (MFU)




Recent Swat situation was basically created by Maulana Fazallulah (MFU) coupled with Jesh and some foreign/inland elements



Utilizing slogan of Nifaz-e-Shariah for public mobilization through use of corner meetings, Mosques and FM Radio - MFU emerged as a

GENESIS OF SWAT CRISES



Using his popularity, he collected large donations and established a Madrasa at Mam Derai and started with fiery speeches in favour of Shariah through his FM Radio

GENESIS OF SWAT CRISES

- Encouraged by his popularity, overwhelming in-land as well as foreign support, and support from TBs, MFU gradually changed focus towards militancy
- Popular religious sentiment got hijacked and his demand for 'Shariah' turned into 'Shariah Ya Shahadat' (Islamic law or Martyrdom)
- He started violence against video/audio centers, barber shops, NGOs, female education, Polio vaccination and Govt functionaries

GENESIS OF SWAT CRISES

- TB evicted Police, established their own Police Stations and started policing
- To display and exercise his authority, MFU also evicted the civil administration and appointed his governors in the areas strongly held by him
- Target killing of local elite and beheading of Police/Frontier Constabulary became a normal practice
- Show of force by display of slaughtered heads on jeeps became a routine practice to harass the general public and Govt functionaries

GENESIS OF SWAT CRISES

- MFU announced Shariah in District Swat and started dispensing justice through his created courts
- MMA (Religious Party) Govt of NWFP not only remained naive but provided tacit support for its own reasons
- Life and property of Khan Khawaneen (Affluent natives) and other notables were threatened and the issue of “Haves and Have Nots” intermingled with the demand for Shariah, weakened the writ of Govt

GENESIS OF SWAT CRISES

- Lal Masjid incident (2007) was encashed by MFU to fuel the already volatile situation which further worsened the writ of Govt
- Consequently, most of Swat less Mingora (Capital of Swat) became **No Go Area** for Law Enforcing Agencies

**ARMY WAS INDUCTED ON 6 JUL
07**


DIV GP ORBAT ON INDUCTION


- Infantry Brigade. Three integral
SIBs
- Mechanized Brigade. Three MIBs

MANDATE

- Deploy ASP and create effects by presence
- Integrate the efforts of all civilians and military int agencies to monitor TB activities in the area
- If required, be prep to dominate the area by Show of Force
- Provide strength to the LEAs and enhance confidence of the law abiding citizens
- Be prep to establish effective control on the movement of TB, when ordered
- Be prep to launch ops on short notice, when ordered

AOR -DIV






MINGORA



MOUNTAINOUS VILLAGES





NARROW
VALLEYS



DEVELOPED BUA




MAIN TOWNS



MED TOWNS



SMALL TOWNS



SCATTERED

UNITO



SUMME
DO



WINTER

6


FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL

STANCES

- Provincial Govt (MMA) resented Army's arrival and refused to requisition it
- Army was made to vacate all Govt bldgs and had to camp in the open
- Army's employment was contested from Jul-Oct 07 (till formulation of Interim Govt before elections)
- Govt decided to launch FC (Frontier Corps) (traditional force) instead of Army in Oct 07
- 3 x wings of FC were inducted on 23 Oct 07
- Op Mtn Viper by FC from 26 Oct – 10 Nov 07

OPERATION
MTN VIPER
(26 OCT - 10 NOV 07)

CONDUCT OF OP MTN VIPER



OUTCOME OF OPERATION

- FC suffered serious set back at Manglaur and Khwazakhela
- Command of Operations handed over to Army on 11 Nov 07

STATE OF TPS/ LOCAL ENVMT

- Army's arrival was being contested by those not interested in its employment; feeling of being out of place had set in the troops
- Anti MFU qtrs were criticizing Army for having come to Swat but doing nothing; unnecessary criticism
- Army had suffered of inaction and yet lost 2 offrs and 16 sldrs while 63 were injured in suicidal and IED attks; restraint created confusion
- Having killed Army's pers and repulsed FC, MFU had emerged as a giant

STATE OF TPS/ LOCAL ENVMT

- For the first time Army was confronting crisis; the basis of which were purely 'Religious' demand of Shariah. Mostly

وہ بھی مسلمان - ہم بھی مسلمان؟؟
شریعت ہی تو مانگ رہے ہیں کچھ غلط تو نہیں کر رہے

They are also Muslims and we are also
Muslims

Is asking for Religious Law too much?



OP RAH-E-HAQ

1ST CHALLENGE

- Raise Morale
- Create conviction in the Cause
- Prepare troops to fight Muslims







CAUSE & CONVICTION

So remind them (O Muhammad) , you are only a one who reminds. You are not a dictator over them.

﴿نمبر ۶﴾


Your duty is only to convey (the Message) and on Us is the reckoning.

﴿سورہ الرعد آیت نمبر ۴۰﴾

OP RAH-E-HAQ

THREAT

- All available resources (MI, IB, ISI and Own sources) indicated presence of following strength of TB in Dist Swat :-
 - Hardcore Militants - 1500 / 2000
(JM, Fazalullah and 100 -125 foreigners)
 - Armed support - 4000/5000
 - Sympathizers - 9000/10000
- The strength of hardcore elements was expected to increase with the arrival of TB from other areas spec Bajaur, Dir and Waziristan. In addn, reinforcement of FFs, dominantly Uzbeks had also been confirmed in the AOR



PIOCHA
R

GAT

TO BIHA

NAMAL
WANAI
CHUPRIAL
UCHRAI
SA

DURSH KHELA
CHAM
TO KALAM

KHWAZAKHEI
A

MATTA

BIA KAND
U

DANG
ARKOT

PIR KALAY

SHAL PALAM

SHAKARDAR
A

GULIBAGH

SHAH DHERI
DERAI
DEVLOI
MANJ
TUTAN BANDA
KALA KALAI
SIRSANAI

SIGRAM

USMANI
SAR

NAJIA TOP
KUZA BANDAI
MAM DHERI

NINGULAI

CHARBAGH

MANGLAUR
SANGHOTA

DAKOT SAR

KABBAL

KANJ
U

FIZAGAT

MINGOR
A

2nd CHALLENGE

Fight 17000 hardcore mscts/extremists
present among 1.6 million peace loving people
within own country

WAY FWD

EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS

NATIONAL ENVMT

LOCAL ENVMT

**E
N**

**F
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**C
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M**


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**P
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WAY FWD AND OPTIONS

- Village by village fighting and clearance in a sequence
- Cordon & search Operation of selected villages
- Encircling strong holds from a position of




EMPLOYMENT CONTOURS

- Domination of Space
- Frontline of People
- Clearance of Area
- Control of Movement
- Social Development


DESIGN OF OPERATION

- While remaining within the basic parameters of approved design of Operation Mtn Viper, reverse the situation in own favor by continuously consolidating existing gains, shaping the envmt for conduct of future ops to impose own will on the TB by initially capturing hard core areas of Kuza Bandai, Bara Bandai, Mam Dheri to weaken their will and reduce influence in main towns by pushing them Northwards. Gradually establishing strong Check Points on all the available river crossings to restrict freedom of movement and choke their supplies and winter support




DESIGN OF OPERATION

- Steadily cont adv towards Matta bottling TB in the rugged mountainous terrain in the North for eventual destruction through synergetic effects of severe weather, terrain, air force, attack helicopters, artillery and kinetic strikes while taking common people on board



OP TO SECURE NAJIA TOP & USMANI SAR
(24 NOV)






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EFFECTS OF TWO PRONGED OPS

- TB shocked and surprised and strong hold encircled
- TB effort divided
- TB vacated area up to Matta in anticipation of our attack
- Villages not attacked -minimum collateral damage and own cas

OP TO SECURE PIR KALAI RIDGE

(3 DEC)






CHANGE IN STRATEGY




FRONT LINE OF


OPERATION TO SECURE MANGLAUR AND CHARBAGH (13 DEC)








OPERATION TO SECURE AREAS FROM GULI BAGH TO KALAM (23 DEC)




**After 17 Div had secured area till Kalam, AOI
b/w**




OPERATION TO SECURE AREAS NW OF MATTA-6 JAN






**OPERATION TO SECURE MATTA, SAMBAT,
BODIGRAM AND CHAM (27 JAN)**






Operation TO SECURE DURSHKHELA (28 JAN)






OPERATION TO SECURE KALAKOT (4 FEB)







PIOCHAR

WAINAI
BRUPRIAL

DURSHKHELA

TO
KALAM

UCHH
SAR

UNIA

KHARAIRI CHAM

MATTA

KHWAZAKHELA

BIAKAND

DANG
ARKOT

GIG

PIRKALAI

SHAL PALAM

PL KR
GULIBAGH
(30)

SHAH
DEERI

MANJ
A

TUTAN BANDA

SHAM BABA

SAR

NANA

NINGULAI

PL SS
(30)

CHARBAGH

BARA BANDAI

KUZA BANDAI

KANJU

HAZAR

DAKOT SAR


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OPERATION FOR CLEARANCE OF SHAH DHERI AND TUTAN BANDA VALLEY (9 FEB)






PIOCHAR


DEPL - 9 FEB 08

Commencing ops on 24 Nov 07, main areas of Swat Valley were cleared by 9 Feb 08; just in 2 ½ months - An unparalleled success. We had succeeded in completing Army's design



CLEARANCE OF AREA CORDON & SEARCH OPS

ORDON & SEARCH OPS Police and Army



CON OF MOV
ESTABLISHMENT OF CHECK
POSTS (CPs)

AYUB BR

AYUB BRIDGE CP


**CONCRET
E BLOCK**

**SEARCH LT
POLE**

BUNKER

HUSKI BAGS

MINGORA



BARA BANDA CP

BUNKER

MINGORA

SEARCH LT

CONCRETE
B LOCK

BARBED
WIRE

LONG
PICKETS

CONCERTIN
A COIL

NINGOLAI



NINGULAI CP

**BUNKER
BN**

**WH
BARRIE
R**

**HANGIN
G
BARRIE
R**

**CONCRETE
BLOCK**



BARYAM BRIDGE CP


BUNKER

BUNKER

HANGIN
G
BARRIE
R

CONCRETE
BLOCK

MATTA



FAZA GAT CP

BUNKER

HANGIN
G
BARRIE
R

BUNKER

BUNKER

CONCRETE
BLOCK

MINGORA



SUSPECTS ARRESTED - PH I

- Apprehended (by Army, FC & Police) -

1374

- Interrogated

1374

- Status

- Black -

51

- Grey

-

123

- White -

1194

- Released -

1194

Abdul
Mateen

Shaq
Ahmed

M. Naeem

Akbar Ali


Taj Ali



Maulvi
Rasheed



Syed Niamat
Ali



Khaista
Rehman



Muhammad
Islam




Bakht Zada



Khurshid Ali



Syed Mnan
Bacha



M. Rasool



Maulvi
Rasheed



M. Rasool

RECOVERED WEAPONS

Ser	Wpns	No
1.	SMGs	33
2.	HMG	1
3.	Shot Guns	122
4.	RPG-7	3
5.	Pistols	75
6.	Rifles/ Repeaters	27
7.	14.5 AA MG	1
8.	Daggers	4
9.	120 mm Mor Carriages	2
10.	12 .7 mm AA Gun	1

RECOVERED AMMO

Ser	Ammo	Qty
1.	RPG-7 Rkts	88
2.	Rds/Carts (all type)	2022
3.	Grens	52
4.	Mor rds	128
5.	Tear Gas Grens	60
6.	Expl	61.1 Kgs
7.	Liquid Expl	8 (Barrels)
8.	Chemicals	388 Kgs

2007/12/04 11:45

RECOVERED VEHS

Ser	Veh	No
1.	Suzuki Jeep	2
2.	Suzuki Pick up	4
3.	Suzuki Van	1
4.	Hino Trk	1
5.	Motor Cycle	2
6.	Toyota Corolla Car	1
7.	Police Mob/Diana Loader	2+1
8.	Land Cruiser White	1

RECOVERED MISC

STORES

Ser	Stores	No
1.	Uniform FC	82
2.	Rain Coats - Police	45
3.	Monitors	18
4.	CPUs	22
5.	Printers	2
6.	Photocopier	1
7.	Steel Helmets	38
8.	Gas Masks	2/5
9.	Hand Cuffs	25
10.	Finger Print Kit	1
11.	Fax Machine	3

RECOVERED MISC

STORES

Ser	Stores	No
12.	Loud Speaker	2
13.	IED Material (Boxes)	81
14.	Visiting Cards	17
15.	Cassettes (Audio)	1575
16.	Cassettes (Vidio)	20
17.	Jacket Cdo	1
18.	Wirless Sets	5
19.	Stablizers	10
20.	Scanner	1
21.	Tent Poles/Tent HA	4+1
22.	Pickets	14

TB CAS



	Killed	Injured
Phil (24 Nov 07 - 25 Feb 08)	70	60

OWN CAS



	Own	
	Martyrs	Injured
Depl Ph (4 Jul 07-23 Nov 07)	18	63
Plt I (04 Nov 07-07 Jul 08)	18	63

SOCIAL ASPECTS **WINNING HEARTS AND** **MINDS**

DISTR OF RELIEF GOODS

Ser	Items	Received from		Total
		NDMA	ERRA	
1.	Blankets	9139	2000	11139
2.	Bedding	-	1000	1000
3.	Tents	500	500	1000
4.	Heater Fujica	-	200	200
5.	Gen Set	-	3	3
6.	Warm Clothes	302 Cartons	-	302

2007/12/09 16:30

DISTR OF RELIEF GOODS **(RAT ITEMS)**



- **Food Items**

- **Before Operation**

- **218 Tons**

- **After Operation**

- **746 Tons**

- **Misc Items**

- **Biscuits**

- **2858 pkts**

- **Sweets**

- **6008 pkts**

- **Vermicelli**

- **1429 pkts**

MEETINGS WITH ELDERS AND NOTABLES



JIRGAS WITH ELDERS AND NOTABLES



INTERACTION WITH LOCAL MEDIA



INTERACTION WITH INTL MEDIA



FREE MED CAMPS



FREE MED CAMPS



FREE MED CAMPS





QUICK IMPACT PROJ's (QIPs) DIST SWAT

ALOC OF FUNDS

- Total amount - 1000 M
- Total UCs - 65
- Khwazakhela and North/Shangla - 300 M
- Remaining Swat - 700 M

ESTAB OF FM STAs

- TB FM Dislodged and estab of Radio “Mera Swat”
 - 500 W (High Power) FM transmitter installed airing regular commercial broadcast as “My Swat”
 - Radio station broadcasting recorded as well as live programs from own as well as any other location
 - Broadcasting programs on religious, cultural, social and education issues
- FM Station for Neut/Ctr propaganda
 - 3 x FM Stations established :-
 - 1 x 250 W (Med power) at Uchrai Sar
 - 1 x 50 W (low power) at Uchrai Sar
 - 1 x 10 W (low power) at Mingora





**PEOPLE MADE AS FRONT
LINE - SEPARATION OF
BLACK AND WHITE**



BLACK WAS PUT ON THE RUN

HFP



WHILE THE WHITE
REMAINED WITH US

POLICE REHABILITATED



LIFE IN GEN



LIFE IN GEN



LIFE IN GEN



LIFE IN GEN

Allied Bank



الائڈ بینک



LIFE IN GEN



LIFE IN GEN



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
LIFE IN GEN



ELECTION 2008



GOVERNANCE RESTORED IN DIST SWAT



Militarily an envmt was created
to facilitate the Political
Process

POLITICAL PROCESS

TRANSITION TO PEACE **TALKS / AGREEMENT**

PROPOSED DIALOGUE

STRAT

Ser	POL GOVT	By TB
1.	Establish rules of engagement for interim period of peace talks	Create conditions
2.	Right to react in case of resurgence	-
3.	-	Denounce militancy
4.	Announcement of Nizam-e-Adl and token/partial draw down of Army	Lay down arms/surrender /hand over criminals
5.	Take out leadership	Face charges
6.	Prevent rise of next leadership. Amnesty to those not involved in serious crimes	
7.	5 Yrs Qaumi Razakar Scheme	Join mainstream
4.	Dev of area (Yr of FATA and PATA)	Emp of youth
5.	Capacity bldg of I FAs and De-	Disassociate from other

PEACE AGREEMENT

معاهدہ صوبائی حکومت اور مقامی طالبان سوات کے درمیان

1. Taliban will respect the provincial and
2. Govt will enforce Sharia in Malakand
3. Other religions will not be targeted
4. Govt will release prisoners after review of
5. Taliban will not attack govt officials, ban women education, use IED or conducts suicide attacks

PEACE AGREEMENT

Army will be withdrawn on improvement of
Taliban will handover all foreign militants
and pledge not to force closure of women
shopping ; Compensation will be paid to all affectees

Taliban will not oppose vaccination of
children or oppose women health workers

Unlicensed weapons will not be allowed

Taliban will give guarantee closing all
training centers including suicide and IED
training schools. Taliban will disarm

FM Radio will only be allowed to operate under

All criminals will be handed over to the Government

PEACE AGREEMENT

Government will ensure that people are provided justice and all adulterers, criminals

.14

Main Taliban HQ will be converted into a peaceful religious school

.15

Peace agreement enforcement members were nominated from both sides

.16

1. افرا سیاب خٹک	2. مولانا محمد آئین
3. بشیر احمد بلور	4. علی بخت
5. رحیم داد خان	6. مسلم خان
7. واجد علی خان	8. محمود خان
9. ڈاکٹر شمشیر	10. ثار خان

TRANSITION TO PEACE TALKS

- Political Rhetoric of Provincial Govt
 - Peace through talks
 - Return of Army
- Peace Agreement
 - No denouncement, laying down of arms, arrests, surrender, village defense committees and accountability
 - Arrested TB released
- TB emboldened to cont their activities unabated

Army's success was followed by
lack of political resolve, non-
existent governance, very weak
LEAs, poor role of Intelligence
agencies, non payment of
compensation and no socio-eco
development

Initially provided breather was
lost due to political follow up and
an appeasing

“Live and let Live”

Peace Agreement

All our achievements were
wasted as we lost ground

basically on 5 critical scores¹⁴³

1

LOSS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT



Gen public who sided with the Army in flushing out the TB found themselves at the mercy of returning TB (Agreement, Restraint by the Army, Surrender Policy). Their faith got affected in the Army/ Govt and they immediately patched up under duress with the TB taking them as a living reality – Black and White again got mixed up¹⁴⁴

2

LEADERSHIP VACUUM



Some Khawaneen got victimized and most of them left the area. Newly elected members not only ran away but thanklessly started bad mouthing without realizing that it was their muck to be cleaned by the Army. We were left to operate in leadership vacuum with additional

3

RETURN OF TB



As a result of long negotiations, restraint by the Army & appeasing Peace Agreement, TB returned better equipped/organized, more in strength, improved resolve and vengeance. All secured areas got reoccupied for the Army to

4



Own Techniques and Tactics was now fully known to the TB

5

NAMAL
BIHA
WAINAI
BRIUPRA L
UCHRAI SAR
RUNI AL
DANG ARKOT
BIAKAND
GIG A
PIRKAL SHAL PALAM
MATTA SAMBAT
KALAKOT 7 KM DURSHIKHE LA
TO KALAM
SHAH DHERI
MANJ A
USMANI SAR
NINGULAI
GULIBAGH
TUTAN
SHAM B
NAJIA
BARA BANDAI
KUZA BANDAI
MINJOR
COY 68
WING

16 BR
16 PR
11 CORPS
10 CORPS
29 PR
63 FF
15 FF
6 AK
29 PR

Securing of 95% of Swat was only possible by physical presence. This winning stride extended tps all over Swat in Round 1. In a changed envmt, posts of 40/50 pers on widely spread distances were diluted and over stretched. Their effect reduced. They suffered

5

NAMAL
BIHA
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WING

16 BR
16 PR
11 CORPS
10 CORPS
29 PR
63 FF
15 FF
6 AK
15 FF
6 AK (-)
CS
WING

Securing of 95% of Swat was only possible by physical presence. This winning stride extended tps all over Swat in Round 1. In a changed envmt, posts of 40/50 pers on widely spread distances were diluted and over stretched. Their effect reduced. They suffered

MAIN CHALLENGE

Fight the 2nd Rd of Operation Rah-e-Haq without effective support from Govt, in a governance and leadership vacuum among indifferent and scared people and yet defeat well reinvigorated enemy **ONCE AGAIN**

TB STRAT

TB STRAT

- Exploitation of governance and leadership vacuum to establish parallel writ
- Target killings/ intimidation of influentials
- Instigating poor class against khawaneen/notables Exploitation of Haves and Have Nots, a dimension readily acceptable to the poor class

TB STRAT

- Shifting emphasis from mil targets to vital Govt utility installations to frustrate general public against LEAs
- Deliberate Targeting of Police and FC to trigger desertions and resignations

TB STRAT



Extortion, looting, arson and ransom collecting activities adding to general insecurity of public

TB STRAT

Hitting soft targets like schools (*out of total of 1571 schools 89 girls and 29 boys schools destroyed*), grid/gas stations and other important installaton mostly away from LEAs'



Total Schools – 1571 (Girls 566 and

TB STRAT

Disruption of communication infrastructure
trying to paralyze the life in general and
movement of troops in particular (17 x Bridges
and Culverts)



TB STRAT




Sponsor and force Anti Govt/Army processions

TB STRAT



Provision of justice and display of will to enforce

TB STRAT



UNKNOWN PERSONS DESTROY SCHOOLS AND TARGET ARMY

Control media through threats and exploiting use of FM
- Indeed media supported the TB to establish their writ

NEGATIVES


NEGATIVES

- Pub perception:-
 - Military and TBs same - Public as sufferer
 - No TB leader killed particularly MFU
 - Mam Derai not destroyed
 - Agencies regulating insurgency on behalf of USA
 - Govt and Army regulating insurgency to welcome USA
 - ANP Govt support TBs covertly hence the peace agreement
 - Hard core TBs left under surrender policy
 - Hard core TBs left after apprehension - interrogation

NEGATIVES

- Pub perception
 - Military not doing enough but affecting common man's life through
 - Curfew
 - CPs
 - Collateral damage
- Public Frustration
 - Electricity, water and gas
 - Affected economic and price hike
 - Curfew/ CPs
- Impatience and bad mouthing by those not involved

TB STRAT + NEGATIVES + **OWN WEAKNESSES**



Army outstretched in 95 % of

Every Government property and
individual served as a Target for
the TB

Army not on a guard duty alone

Police working with 50%
deficiency/desertions

Frontier Constabulary working
with 46% deficiency/desertions

No security system for pub utility
installations, Govt buildings, schools
and other assets

Peoples' failure to defend their own
properties and life

Least Media support

No Socio - Eco Dev

No Village Defense Committees

EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS

NATIONAL ENVMT

LOCAL ENVMT

**E
N**

**F
O
R
C
E**

**P
E
O
P
L
E**

**C
I
V
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D
M**

**M
E
D
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A**

**P
O
L**

**D
E
V**

Army on a solo flight




OP RAH-E-HAQ PH-II

RAH-E-HAQ - PH II



RAH-E-HAQ - PH II



SARBAND

RUNIAL

**DANG
ARKOT**

**TB attk on Sarbanda
(28 Jul)**

**21 x TB incl Toor
Mullah (Imp
Commander) were
killed**

KHOWAZAKHELA

GULIBAGH

SHAKARDAR

NINGULAI

CHARBAGH

BARA BANDAI

MAM DERA

KANJU

GULJABA

MINGORA

KABBAL

DAKOT SAR

TUTAN BANDA

DEVLOI

MANJA

**HAH
HERI**

TB CAS



RAH-E-HAQ - PH II



C & S OF DEVLOI(6 Aug)

Imp TB leader Ali Bakht killed

DEVLOI

ALI BAKHT




WAY FORWARD-JUL 08

- Linkup with all isolated posns/posts to enhance own sustainability and domination of AOR
- An additional brigade was provided to Swat
- Formulation of offensive and defensive brigades

RAH-E-HAQ - PH II



KABAL (23 Aug 08)



- Transition from rural to urban terrorism (GW)
- TB, for the first time, gave a pitched battle
- FFs led and fought along with the TB
- Renewed tactics of use of vegetation, mouse holing and use of Sniper positions in trees by TB
- 44 TB killed. Suffered 24 casualties
- New challenges understood
- Correction applied

KUZA BANDAI (2 - 22 SEP 08)

RABBIT HUNT

85x TB killed
90x TB injured

Wpns Rec

SMGs - 32


Pistols - 29

Shotguns - 36

Rifles - 13

Grens - 6

Own Cas - 4



EMERGENCE OF AMAN COMMITTEE



28 12:45


15 x CORDON AND CLEARANCE OPS

TB Cas/Losses


576 x TB Killed

739 x TB injured

71x houses, 45x Shops & 2x Bunkers destroyed



DOMINATION OF MINGORA




**Day / night patrolling of imp locations in the city,
snap actions by SOF and regular tps, covert
actions by SSG to eliminate TB in the city,
protection to Traffic Police**

AIR STRIKES



Extreme Restraint for Swat Being a Settled Area



Undertaking given by elders of 12 vills to prevent TB activities in Isha Khel Area in support of the Army

MINGORA



Relatively stabilized

EAST OF RIVER



Elders of Sangota, Manglour, Charbagh and Gulibagh poised to fol Isha Khel model.

Mscts strength continued
to increase with support
from FATA and situation of
uneasy stability existed in
Swat

TB CAS



Phs	Killed		Injured	
	Air	Gr Op	Air	Gr Op
Ph-I (24 Nov 07 - 27 Jul 08)	-	70	-	60
Ph-II (29 Jul -31 DEC 08)	246	576	210	639
G/Total	892		909	

OWN CAS - OPERATION RAH-E-HAQ



	Own	
	Shaheed	Injured
Depl Ph (4 Jul 07-23 Nov 07)	18	63
Ph-I (24 Nov 07-27 Jul 08)	13	88
Ph-II (28 Jul 08- 31 Dec 08)	70	198

SITUATIONAL AND PERCEPTUAL ARGUMENTS

Sit and Perceptual Arguments

- Why the TB leadership could not be eliminated ?
- Why the TB FM Network was not destroyed ?
- Why Army could not stop Target killing ?
- Why TB could dispense justice in the presence of Army?
- Why Army could not stop destruction of schools ?
- Why was MFU holding press conf but not killed ?
- Why Mam Derai was not destroyed ?
- Why the Army is not succeeding ?
- Is the Army's resolve low ?





SITUATIONAL
ANALYSIS
CUM LESSONS
TOP TO BOTTOM

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- Governance issues are best tackled through improved governance and not by use of force. Army's employment to redress governance failure appears to be an easy solution, but is it conceptually correct? Exploitable agendas and issues with a potential to grow into LIC cannot be pushed under the carpet but addressed squarely through good governance and in good time to take the wind out of storm

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- Absence of singleness of conception b/w Federal and Provincial Govt created an unfavourable and non supportive envmt for Army's employment. Ops were conducted during pol upheaval and period of Interim Govt/Emergency. Later, it fell victim to even deeper pol confusion. The fissure at national level denied exploitation of success made by the Army. In the realm of ends, ways and means, only a well orchestrated interplay b/w all instruments of national power will ensure achieving the desired end state

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- Despite all odds, Army delivered and flushed out the TB from 95 % of Swat just within 2 ½ months; an unparallel success which became one legged in the wake of pol failure. Even if the Army wins, it will always require requisite pol follow up and reforms to consolidate the success for a lasting solution, failing which it would only be an effort in futility

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- As a result of prolonged pol tussle of about 9 yrs, Army with an affected image needed to shift the ownership of ops to the Pol Govt. It therefore, deliberately gave the required space to the Pol Govt to take the lead role in brokering peace. Hence, during negotiations there was no rep from the Army. Army also restrained itself from proactive ops to prevent the blame game. This facilitated TB return and their unabated activities which affected people and their faith in the Army. Tac Forces do not draw strength from ambiguous and woolly directions and envmt

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- ~~It is a very well dir LIC support by IIP and those~~
who do not wish to see a stable Pakistan. In addition, criminals, 3rd rated unemployed youth and Madrassah students mustered in the name of anti US sentiments, Jihad and Shariah not only make an effective pipeline for TB but also makes the dynamics even more complex. **National level effort cannot be replaced by tac pursuits**

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- In an effort to gain quick pol mileage from mil victory, Provincial Govt hastily brokered an appeasing peace agreement and overlooked its crafty mgmt. Basic reason to fight which was imposn of Shariah was not addsd. A quickly negotiated pol agreement wasted Army's achievements and sacrifices; a classical incompatibility of a pol system to undo success and leave its forces High and Dry. Comprehensive Politico-Mil strategy will only lead to achieving national objectives in LIC envmt

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- ~~Army declared victory. In the wake of flawed pol~~
follow up, Army could see the return of reinvigorated TB and evolving vulnerabilities of outstretched troops but could not strengthen its forces. Vulnerable and isolated troops not only fought for their sustenance but also conducted ops. This compounded the problem and made the force configuration incompatible. Incompatible force configuration would require only a miracle to succeed – **Retention of balanced forces and timely mgmt of success is an art which we must cont to learn**

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- Having lost in Ph-I and spent the winters in mtns, reinforced TB, filled with vengeance improved their tac and resolve. This time they transited to Urban areas for which we were neither trained nor equipped. Avoidance of collateral damage and FIBUA with limited number of troops available comparatively slowed the progress of ops and raised concern among impatient qtrs to undermine Army's resolve and ability to cbt LIC. Perception and optics management requires dedicated efforts. Similarly fighting Urban Terrorism in own Cty is very challenging and requires own special trg and development emphasis

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- Incompatible int system could not support the ops and created a vacuum. Absence of actionable int not only prevented pro-active ops, it also denied undertaking preventive measures. Optimum effectiveness of a force in LIC can only be yielded with an effective int support mechanism

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- ~~There was just no alternate available to the Army~~ to consolidate its gains and establish the writ. Army did not have enough troops to leave behind and protect the areas cleared through fighting and sacrifices. Hence the gains were eroded soon after they were made. Availability of commensurate LEAs, effective civil administration and peoples' mechanism in the form of Defense committees are essential to consolidate the mil gains and lead counter LIC Operation to its logical end

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- TB leadership being C of G could not be eliminated through conventional ops, as they remained beyond reach, roving and well protected in their hidings. This could best be done through covert means, where we failed. Again, an effective int system can really be a force multiplier in LIC. We need to upgrade, restructure and re-organize our intelligence

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- Use of force hurts people and injures the society.

We need to understand that in such prolonged ops, generak sense of insecurity and threat to the lives of people can affect internal dynamics thus making these unfavorable to the forces. This calls for an effective perception mgmt and parallel Hearts and Minds Winning Campaign with the military always acting in spirit of humanity

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- Governance failed miserably; in fact there was vacuum or even blackout. Army endeavored hard to fill this vacuum and manage the public involved in a rift of Haves and Have Nots. We had to deal with small unions, manage processions, articulate essential services, prevent strikes and even facilitate essential provisioning. It is extremely difficult to conduct ops and manage indifferent public in a leadership and governance vacuum. **Strong governance and local administration is essential to free the forces of routine worries to cbt LIC**

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- Media, specially coerced local news papers became an effective conduit to terrorize the people and spread dissatisfaction among them. Operations without effective media support in an unfavorable envmt will always lead to misperceptions and despondency, which necessitates launching of an elaborate IO Campaign to support own operations

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- It is extremely difficult to get out of conventional mindset. Sldrs find it exceedingly difficult to understand restraints and intrigues of LIC ops. Mil ethics and ROEs while operating within own Cty could be quite intricate, hence demanding requisite clarity and flexibility as per situation dictates. Leaders at all the tiers need to have “hands on” apch to guide their men for befitting situation responses

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- Motivation is an expendable sentiment and state of mind. It requires constant and deliberate effort to motivate and clear the cause to our men. Leaving it to Khateeb (Chaplain) or simply verbally motivating the soldiers and thinking of having done a great service does not fulfil the purpose. Good protection gears, efficient casualty handling, timely leave, relief/rotation, good administration/log, care of families in rear and prompt honours and awards are the minimum essentials to keep the force motivated. It is a hands on job which requires personal touch, large heartedness and inspiring interaction to maintain the fighting spirit by leading from the front

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- LIC ops are not time bounded and hence protracted in nature. At the end, mil forces or the insurgents/guerrillas/terrorists, the one who displays perseverance will ultimately decide the fate of such ops

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- Popular sentiment of locals, in favour of imposition of Sharia, indicated that Army had come on the behest of the Khans/Notables to fight their war (Haves/Have Nots). Use of Force in an unfavourable envmt and divided society cannot create unison or unity of effort

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- LEAs being in uniform remained conspicuous by presenting a clear target and location. It was too easy for the TB to snipe or conduct a fire raid on own posts or ambush own convoys. On the contrary, chasing a shadow where black and white had mixed up particularly in int vacuum, was extremely difficult. Its all about mismatch of Conventional Forces put to fight a hide and seek game for which they are not trained. Use of Conventional Forces for LIC would require improved int support system to undo this disadvantage

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

- LIC ops involve Proactive, Reactive and Driving-in situations. leadership at all tiers need to understand the complexities/constantly changing envmt which the troops on ground are facing. It must be realized that in these situations sure footed, steady and flexible timings invariably lead to successful culmination of ops with minimum collateral damage and own casualties. Patience, especially by senior leadership emerges vital to give requisite confidence to those at the execution end

SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS


- In spite of heavy casualties inflicted to the TB, their reinforcements and material support continued from the adjoining areas, through FATA. Killing them saw only more influx of militants, as the ones in FATA and Afghanistan felt an obligation to support their brothers in arms. Fighting in LIC needs to be all encompassing and spread to simultaneously engage the enemy at all fronts. Non engagement areas under militant influence will always pose problems for forces in the engagement areas

CURRENT SITUATION

EXPOSING TB MALICIOUS INTENTIONS

- TB's popular demand for Shariah, basis for their popularity, accepted
- Even after enforcement, their activities continued unabated
- Militant reach extended to Buner (Neighbouring District of Swat). International apprehensions increased
- People of Swat realized the real intentions of TB and backed Govt/Army to launch an Operation to eliminate them

REINFORCED OPERATION



COMPREHENSIVE CLEARANCE

- Msct leadership targeted
- Local Lashkars made
- Emphasis on holding ground
- Continuous operations and reaching inaccessible/unexplored areas of the Valley
- Political leadership involved
- Comprehensive IO

SWAT or AFGHANISTAN ?

- Locals tired of injustices and deprivation
- Increase in the number of “Have Nots”
- Apathetic Govt machinery
- Conditions suitable for religious zealots to step ahead and address peoples’ grievances
- Popular slogan of Shariah/Justice and equality for all helped in mustering locals support

SWAT or AFGHANISTAN ?

- Movement/activities considered insignificant by those at helm of affairs
- Changed dynamics/environment of the area presented opportunity for other militant organizations to further own agendas and increase their sphere of influence (Taliban from FATA in case of Swat and AQ in case of Afghanistan)

SWAT or AFGHANISTAN ?

- Religious zealots establish writ in most of the area
- Militant activities aim at increasing their operational reach (Inland by TBs of Swat and West (9/11 etc) by AQ in Afghanistan)
- Action by the Actors at helm of affairs (Pak Army moved to Swat and NATO/ISAF to Afghanistan)
- Immediate success in unhinging the grip of the militant groups and restoration of writ in most parts of the area

SWAT or AFGHANISTAN ?

- Militants avoided fight and commenced Guerrilla Warfare
- Comprehensive Ends, Ways and Means not worked out solve the root cause
- Leadership of TB escaped. Pockets of uncontrolled area left for breeding and regrouping of TB
- Forces spread all over the area (Everywhere, yet no where)
- Political process brought those in power who were clueless about solving the issue and were resultantly rejected by the masses
- Fruitless Hearts and Minds Winning Campaign

SWAT or AFGHANISTAN ?

- Resurgence of TB. More organized, trained and aware of security forces vulnerabilities
- Most of the area shifted from stability to instability
- Local perception about security forces changed. Accusation of hidden motives and agendas surfaced in populace
- Locals started passively siding with TB, as the effectiveness of security forces reduced

SWAT or AFGHANISTAN ?

- National conviction/support started withering
- Differences between reality and perception raised doubts about efficacy of Armed Forces
- Root demand of the locals not met – Safety from Taliban

What Worked in Swat

- TB engaged in talks and their demand, also popular amongst locals, met (Only to uncover hidden agendas)
- On exposing the malicious designs of the TB, extensive media campaign launched to muster country wide support
- People of Swat and rest of the country demanded ruthless elimination of the TB
- All out offensive launched, sealing routes of reinforcement and simultaneous lethal engagement of neighbouring areas and bifurcate msct's efforts

What Worked in Swat

- Comprehensive defeat of TB by fighting them in their strongholds, by first removing all civilians/non combatants to refugee camps. More forces inducted
- Capture/elimination of TB leadership
- Raising locals to fight the defeated/running TB
- Continuous presence in the area and providing security to locals from TB
- Commencement of schools, law and order machinery etc in ex TB strongholds to send message of stability all across the Valley
- Key requirement of locals understood and addressed - **Safety and security from the Bad Guys**

QUESTIONS